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Protection of development-induced
internally displaced persons under the
African Charter: the case of the
Endorois community of Northern Kenya
Laurence Juma
Abstract
The discourse on development-induced displacement has highlighted the
enormity of problems faced by communities who are forcefully removed to
create room for development projects, while at the same time, exposed the
insularity of national and international legal frameworks for their protection.
Using the case of Centre for Minority Rights Development (CEMIRIDE) on
behalf of the Endorois Community v Kenya (No 276/200), decided by the
African Commission on Human and People's Rights in November 2009, this
article analyses the support that regional and continental rights enforcement
mechanisms could provide to the protection of IDPs, particularly those
displaced by development projects. The article concludes that whereas there
may be a need for expanding the reach of law in providing protection to
development-induced IDPs, it may still be worthwhile to explore the
possibility of reverting to the regional human rights protection mechanism
to meet the shortfall in protection and assistance provided by the existing
IDP laws.
INTRODUCTION
The existing legal frameworks for protection and assistance of internally
displaced persons (IDPs) only marginally address the distinct needs of
communities displaced by development projects.' Their shortfall could be
LLB (Nairobi); LLM (Pennsylvania); MA (Notre Dame); LLD (Fort Hare); Associate
Professor of Law, Rhodes University, Republic of South Africa.
For a discussion of these frameworks see Juma 'Protection regimes for community
displaced by development projects in Kenya: an overview of international regional and
domestic frameworks' (paper presented at the 14" Conference of the International
Association of the Study of Forced Migration (IASFM), held in Kolkata, India, 6-9
January 2013 (on file with the author)).
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attributed to the invisibility of development-induced IDPs given that the
discourse on internal displacement focuses more on displacements caused
by armed conflict than on those caused by development projects. 2 This
invisibility has obviously been compounded by the global logic of
development which places a premium on the attainment of economic growth
and 'modernisation' through the agency of the nation-state and transnational
corporations. This logic has propounded the belief, though contestable, that
all national development projects are in the public interest.3 Apart from the
foregoing, diminished protection for development-induced IDPs also arises
from the assumption that mechanisms for safeguarding rights, including
those that may be violated in the process of implementing projects, are
available to all citizens. The argument is that since internally displaced
persons remain within the territorial jurisdiction of one state, their physical
access to national judicial structures is not inhibited by the fact of
displacement. Although this argument treads the same tired path of sanctity
of sovereignty, and its lustre may be slowly ebbing away, its effect of
nudging policy, and even jurisprudence, in directions less sensitive to the
rights of local communities has not dissipated.
Recently, however, there has been considerable effort to put in place
normative frameworks for the protection of IDPs generally. Within nascent
2 The situation may be worse for marginalised communities, such as the indigenous and
minority groups in Northern Kenya. See eg Sheek, Atta-Asamoah & Sharamo 'Kenya's
neglected IDPs: internal displacement and vulnerability of pastoral communities in
northern Kenya' ISS Situation Report 8 October 2012, available at:
http://wardheernews.com/Organizations/ISS/Kenyas neglected%20IDPs.pdf (last
accessed 28 December 2012).
See eg Cernea 'Involuntary resettlement and development' (1988) 25 Fin & Dev 44;
Patridge 'Involuntary resettlement in development projects' (1989) 2 J of Refugee
Studies 373; Oliver-Smith 'Involuntary resettlement, resistance and political
empowerment' (1991) 4 JofRefugee Studies 132.
See eg Guiding principles on internal displacement UN doc E/CN/add 2 noted in Comm
Hum Rts Res 1998/50 (hereafter Guiding principles); African Union Convention for the
Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, 22 October
2009, (hereafter Kampala Convention) available at:
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4ae572d82.html (last accessed 20 December
2012); Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons
(2006) (hereafter Great Lakes Protocol), available at: http://www.intemal-
displacement.org/8025708FO04BE3Bl/(httplnfoFiles)/29D2872A54561F66C12572F
B002BC89A/$file/Final% 20protocol%/ 2OProtection%/ 20IDPs%/ 20-% 2OEn.pdf, (last
accessed 20 December 2012); Protocol on the Property Rights of Returning Persons,
30 November 2006, available at:
http://www.1se.ac.uk/collections/law/projects/greatlakes/4.0%20Humanitarian%/ 2Oand
%20Social%20Issues/4c.%/ 20Protocols/Final% 20protocol.PropertyRights%/ 20-
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normative architecture, there have been glimpses of reference to
development-induced displacement, but none substantive enough to deal
with the entire spectrum of the perverse pathologies arising from the
implementation of development projects. Thus, dearth of normative
framework for the protection of this category of IDPs, remains one of the
greatest challenges of our time. In response to this challenge, however, this
article suggests that whereas there may be need for expanding the reach of
law in providing protection to development-induced IDPs, it may still be
worthwhile to explore the possibility of reverting to the regional human
rights protection mechanism to meet the shortfall in protection and
assistance provided by the existing IDP laws. This suggestion is not
something new. Indeed, The Great Lakes Protocol on Internal Displacement,
and even the new Internally Displaced Persons Act (2012) recently passed
by Kenya's parliament, have both alluded to the fact that IDPs could be
encouraged to pursue a remedy through available regional and sub-regional
rights protection mechanisms. What this article proposes to do, therefore, is
to reflect on how rights litigation based on the African Charter for Human
and Peoples Rights could canvass this important protection imperative.
Though the article focuses on the Centre for Minority Rights Development
(CEMIRIDE) on behalfoftheEndorois Community vKenya, a case decided
by the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights in November
2009, its analysis is framed on the protection paradigm, and covers a wide
variety of issues that have emerged as important for IDP protection, such as
property, compensation or restitution, and achievement of durable solutions.
BACKGROUND
Most incidences of development-induced displacement adversely affect the
urban poor, pastoralists, and indigenous communities in arid and semi-arid
areas of northem Kenya. This is largely because the lands in these areas are
either held within trust arrangements beholden to exploitative tenure systems
established by the colonial rulers and wholly adopted at independence, or
that their occupation is deemed 'illegal' as far as the existing land ownership
regimes are concerned.' For these reasons, their displacement has
En%20r.pdf (hereafter Great Lakes Protocol) (last accessed 20 December 2012).
5 See Centre for Minority Rights Development (CEMIRIDE) on behalf of the Endorois
Community v Kenya, Comm'n No 276/2003, African Commission on Human & Peoples
Rights (2006) (hereafter the Endorois case).
6 A series of land laws, beginning with the Native Trust Lands Ordinance of 1939 had
vested community land on the British Crown. At independence, the government
transferred these lands to Local Councils to hold in trust for communities. See Keeyah
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implications for human rights in a variety of ways. For example, for the
urban poor, arbitrary displacement in the form of evictions may have
implications on their rights to adequate housing.' As for the pastoralists and
indigenous communities, their rights to property and culture may be in issue.
Undoubtedly, the link between human rights and displacement has a greater
resonance in development-induced displacement than has hitherto been
acknowledged. In my view, the decision in the Endorois case has affirmed
this link by providing some vantage points from which to articulate a role for
human rights litigation in the protection of IDPs displaced by development
projects.
The Endorois case
It all started in the 1970s when the Kenyan government decided to develop
the area around Lake Bogoria, in Kenya's Rift Valley province, into a game
reserve. The area was then inhabited by members of the Endorois
community, a sub-group of the larger Kalenjin ethnic group. In 1974, the
government gazetted the land as a wildlife reserve and ordered the members
of Endorois community to move out.' Coercive government action began
immediately thereafter when some four hundred families were removed.9 At
the time, a meagre compensation was offered though it remains unclear
whether payment was actually made. Another wave of expulsions came in
1983 when houses were set on fire and properties destroyed under the
supervision of the provincial administration. To resist government action,
the members of the community formed an organisation called the Endorois
Welfare Council which resolved to seek redress in court. This resulted in a
series of cases in local courts, culminating in a High Court decision in 2002.
The court dismissed the claim thus shutting down virtually all legal avenues
for resisting government action." Assisted by a London based NGO,
'Indigenous people's land rights in Kenya: a case study of the Maasai and Ogiek peoples'
(2007) 15 Penn. St. Envtl L. Rev. 397, 414. A great deal of abuse has resulted from this
trust arrangement. See Juma 'Private property, environmental and constitutional change'
in Juma & Ojwang (eds) In land we trust (1996) 374.
See eg Juma 'Nothing but a mass of debris: urban evictions and the right of access to
adequate housing in Kenya' (2012) 12/2 Afr Hum Rts J470-507.
Kenya Government Gazette Notice No 239 of 1973. See also, Singoe & Shepherd 'In
Land we trust: the Endorois communication and the quest for indigenous peoples rights
in Africa' 2010 Buffalo Hum Rts L Rev 58.
Lynch 'Becoming indigenous in the pursuit of justice: The African Commission on
Human and People's Rights and the Endorois' (2011) 111 Afr Affairs 24.
0 See William Ngasia & Others v Baringo County Council & Others High Court Misc
Application No 183 of 2000 (High Court, Nakuru)(Application brought under section
84 of the 1963 Constitution, challenging their removal from land and the methods of
214
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Minority Rights Group, and the Centre for Minority Rights Development
(CEMIRIDE), the community took the case to the African Commission on
Human and Peoples Rights in 2003." Their claim was that their removal
from traditional land violated, 'not only their property rights, but that their
spiritual, cultural and economic ties to land were severed'. 12 The community
sought restitution of their ancestral land as their main remedy, and monetary
compensation.13 The final decision came in 2009, effectively declaring the
government action of removing members of the community from around
Lake Bogoria to be in violation of their rights to free practice of religion
(article 8), property (article 14), culture (article 17), and development
(article 21), as guaranteed in the African Charter on Human and Peoples
Rights.14 This decision raises a number of issues that have implications for
displacement. Before I examine the substantive issues, it may be useful to
unravel what I consider to be the link between the rights and displacement
paradigms.
Rights v displacement: whither, thither?
Although the complaint to the African Commission was based solely on the
violation of rights under the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights,
the case offers a legitimate prism through which to reflect on how the IDP
protection frameworks, from the Guiding Principles to the Great Lakes
Protocol mentioned earlier, and human rights could converge to offer
protection and assistance to development-induced IDPs in Kenya. In my
view, the Commission's decision presents several possibilities of finding
such a convergence. The basic premise is obviously the acknowledgment
that the complaint represented a direct challenge against displacement by
questioning the legality of the state's use of its power of eminent domain.
This immediately reveals the linkage of human rights to the displacement
event which can be couched in the proposition that if the act that causes
displacement has violated rights, then its legality should be in doubt. While
the Commission was put in a position where it had to decide on the contours
of the powers of eminent domain, and make a pronouncement on the
inherent limitations to such powers, based on the Charter, the underlying fact
of displacement provided the vantage point from which to configure the full
allocation of revenue collected from the park).
See Singoe & Shepherd n 8 above at 58.
12 Endorois n 5 above at par 19.
13 Id at par 22.
1 Singoe & Shepherd n 8 above at 80. The decision was finally ratified by the African
Union in February 2010. See Lynch n 9 above at 24.
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import of rights in these circumstances. The recognition of the status of the
community as 'indigenous peoples', was instrumental in constructing the
state's responsibility in this regard and exposing the weaknesses inherent in
its exercise of the power of eminent domain. Then there was the question of
violations of rights arising from the displacement event itself. And here
rights to property, culture, and development, were implicated and therefore
articulated within the rubric of a rights regime established by the African
Charter and other international instruments. It is instructive that the
violations of these rights were found to flow from the fact of displacement.
The emphasis, for example, of the attachment to land and its spiritual and
religious significance to the community, both reinforced the court's view of
the magnitude of the state's culpability when they forced the community to
leave the land.
On the other hand, the Guiding Principles, the Great Lakes Protocol, and
even Kenya's Internally Displaced Persons Act 2012, affirm the availability
of these rights to displaced persons. The human rights provisions in these
laws could very well be an added arrow in the quiver, and a similar claim in
the future could benefit accordingly. Despite the above, it is useful to
acknowledge that the scope of protection for development-induced IDPs
within the African Charter framework, is limited as compared to the
instruments specific to IDPs. Although article 60 and of the Charter" may
enable the Commission to stretch its jurisdiction, and perhaps rely on these
instruments to find violations in respect of displacements, the range of
mechanisms available, and the objectives of finding durable solutions are
articulated much more specifically in the IDP instruments than in the
Charter. Nonetheless, the linkage between the two paradigms exists, and it
opens more than mere possibilities for litigating disputes implicating both
1 It provides that: 'The Commission shall draw inspiration from international law on
human and peoples' rights, particularly from the provisions of various African
instruments on human and peoples' rights, the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter
of the Organization of African Unity, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other
instruments adopted by the United Nations and by African countries in the field of human
and peoples' rights as well as from the provisions of various instruments adopted within
the specialized agencies of the United Nations of which the parties to the present Charter
are members.' Many commentators see this provision as allowing the Commission to
apply other human rights instruments. See Viljoen International human rights law in
Africa (2007) 332-334. Note also that the commission, in several of its decisions, has
affirmed its willingness to do so. In Media Rights Agenda vNigeria (2000) AHRLR 262
par 76, the Commission found that principle 5 of the UN Basic Principles on the
Independence of the Judiciary had been violated.
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rights and displacement. The linkage exists as an affirmation of the sanctity
or rights, no matter the circumstances in which we find ourselves.
PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
Deprivation of property is undoubtedly one of the key issues that an IDP
protection regime must tackle. It is not surprising that the relationship
between property and displacement is canvassed in many studies."6 In all
displacement events, communities suffer the trauma of being separated from
their physical possessions as well as their homes. As such, protection oftheir
rights to property is of crucial importance. The guiding principles decree that
IDPs should be assisted to 'recover, to the extent possible, their property and
possessions which they left behind or were disposed of upon
displacement'.' The UN Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for
Refugees and Displaced Persons (Pinheiro Principles)," state that displaced
persons 'should be able to return and repossess and use their housing, land
and property in similar manner to those possessing formal ownership
rights'.1 However, in international law the right to property remains a
nebulous concept, and that is why instruments such as the European
Convention on Human Rights merely guarantee 'peaceful enjoyment of
property' .20 The right often attracts immediate reference to the obligations
to pay compensation or offer restitution, which states are reluctant to
endorse as legally enforceable obligations. For these reasons scholars are
uncertain whether the right to property envisaged in the Guiding Principles,
or any other IDP law for that matter, is a civil and political right available to
legally recognised owners of property, or merely a socio-economic right
'applicable to the customary claims of indigenous people who link land to
their rights to food, housing work, and the right to life itself .21 Although the
16 See eg Paglione 'Individual property restitution: from Deng to Pinheiro, and the
challenges ahead' (2008) IJRL 391; Juma 'Normative and institutional approaches to the
protection of property rights of IDPs in Kenya's Rift Valley Province' (2012) 20/2 Afr
Joflnt'1& Comp L 251-280.
1 Guiding Principles n 4 above, principle 29. This in turn facilitates the objectives of
principle 28 which outlines the obligation to facilitate return.
18 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights Principles on
Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons 28 June
2005, E/CN 4/Sub 2/2005/17, available at:
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/41640c874.html (last accessed 18 May 2011).
19 Id at principle 16. 1.
20 See Singh 'India and internally displaced persons: current legal avenues and new legal
strategies' (2012) 24/3 Int'1JofRefugeeL 509, 514.
21 Id citing Bailliet 'Researching transnational approaches to IDP protection: legal
perspective' 2003 FMR 10.
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Commission did not draw a clear distinction between these two approaches,
its deliberations on the right to property under article 14 of the Charter was
conditioned by the claim before it, which largely rested on the indigeneity
of the claimants and land as the principal object of the right. That it
articulated the indigenous claims through the discourse of 'peoples' rights'
may be uniquely African, but its import on the interpretation of rights that
inure to minorities all over the globe is commendable. The foregoing
notwithstanding, the Commission's construction of the content of the right
to property in light of the displacement, has some obvious benefits for IDP
protection that are worthy of further elucidation.
Meaning of property
The Endorois community claimed that their removal violated their rights to
property in that they had been separated from their homes, general economic
engagements such as cultivation, cattle grazing, and other livelihood
activities around the lake.22 As regards land, the community asserted that
they had traditional rights, interests, and benefits in the land around the lake
recognised under the national law - specifically under the Trust Land Act
and the Constitution 23 - and that these rights inure to the community based
on their recognition as a 'people', within the meaning of the Charter. Since
their claim was based on article 14 of the African Charter, which guarantees
the right to property, the question was whether such interests and benefits
constituted rights protected under the Charter. The Commission observed
that the right to property had previously been defined to include land, access
to one's property, use and control, and even the right not to have one's
property invaded or encroached upon, in the Malawi African Association v
24Mauritania. In the latter case the Commission adopted a dynamic
interpretation of the land rights of the indigenous community which, apart
from land, included the effect of the displacement on homes. It affirmed that
under article 14, states have an obligation not only to 'respect' the right, but
also to 'protect' it. Thus, the forceful removal from homes and the
destruction of houses was found to be in violation of property rights. 25 This
2 Endorois n 5 above at par 87
2 See s 115 of Constitution of Kenya (1963), which gave the County Council in which the
trust land was the authority to ensure that community enjoyed 'such rights, interests, or
other benefits in respect of the land as may under African customary law, for the time be
in force'.
2 Comm Nos 54/91, 61/91, 164/97. See also, Endorois n 5 above at par 186.
2 There is an interesting and perhaps vital connection that the Commission made between
the rights to property and right to adequate housing (par 191). Relying on its decision on
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finding has obvious implications for displacements, which are often
accompanied by forceful and violent action involving the destruction of
houses and other structures, and are all too common in Kenya.
Limitations on right to property
The guarantee of the right to property under article 14 of the Charter has
limitations based on the 'public need' or the 'general interest of the
community', and the requirement that it must conform to relevant laws.
These limitations resonate with the limitation on the general powers of
compulsory acquisition under the current and the former Kenyan
constitutions.26 Thus, it imports considerations that ordinarily revolve around
the principle of eminent domain. It should be noted, however, that the land
which was the subject of claim by the Endorois community was held under
the Trust Land Act, which means that it was held in trust by the local council
on behalf of the community. However, the problem was that the regime of
ownership created by the Act was a precarious one, not only because the
land was still subject to compulsory acquisition under the constitutional
powers of eminent domain, but also as the Act established a modified
procedure of direct acquisition that was relatively easier for the government
and offered minimal safeguards for the community.27 The procedure was
known as 'setting apart', and could be triggered if the trust land was needed
for any government purpose including prospecting for minerals, or vaguely
for a company in which the government held shares. 28 There was no
provision for consultation of or participation by the community, and neither
was the purpose for acquisition required to meet the public interest
threshold. Yet, when the procedure was activated, it extinguished all rights
and interests hitherto held by the community or county council on that land.
The only safeguard was the requirement that compensation be paid to those
adversely affected in accordance with the procedure laid down by the Act.
It is regrettable that so draconian a procedure was allowed to exist in Kenya
for so long (the Act has since been repealed).29 It cannot be denied that such
the SERAC communication, the Commission asserted that although the right to adequate
housing is not expressly provided for in the Charter, the same could be inferred from the
guarantees in art 14.
26 For a discussion of the powers of the eminent domain in the 1963 Kenyan constitution,
see Bhalla 'The effect of modernization on acquisition of property and the rules of
compensation: a Kenyan case' (1990) 2 Afr Jnt'1 & Comp L 234.
2 Trust Land Act s 7.
8 See s 7 of the Trust Land Act and section 118(2) of the Constitution of Kenya (1963).
2 Three new legislations, the National Law Commission Act 2012, the Land Registration
Act 2012 and Land Act 2012, have effectively repealed this Act.
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a drastic abrogation of individual rights to property, such as is inherent in
'setting apart' or any form of compulsory acquisition, should only be
justified in very compelling cases. Having found that the limitations in
article 14 had not been satisfied, the Commission decreed the denial of the
right of ownership under the trust system to be in violation of the Charter.
Further, it decreed that the encroachment, even though mandated by the Act,
was in violation of the community's rights. But what content did the court
prescribe for the elements of these limitations so as to arrive at this
conclusion?
What is public interest?
The Commission had to determine whether the public interest test had been
met in order to reject the government's claim that its action did not violate
any rights as it was within the law. There is no question that that the
community's needs and their rights not to be displaced must be balanced
against the state's responsibility to ensure that the exploitation of natural
resources meets the national objectives. The Kenyan government had
justified the acquisition of the land on the basis that the game reserve that
was sought to be established would ensure that 'wildlife is managed and
conserved so as to yield to the Nation in general and to individual areas in
particular, optimumreturns in terms of cultural, aesthetic and scientific gains
as well as economic gains as are incidental to proper wildlife management
and conservation'. 30 The government claimed that this justified its
encroachment onto the land on the basis of public interest. The Commission
responded to this claim by advancing the proportionality test, which
basically balances the public need to establish a game reserve around the
lake, against the dignity and livelihood of those forcefully evicted and
deprived of their cultural and spiritual rights to the land. The Commission's
view was that the restriction on the right should be absolutely proportionate
to the aim being pursued. It observed that human rights bodies have accepted
'reasonableness' as the standard against which government action must be
measured, and that this demanded a fair and just 'relationship between a
particular objective and the administrative or legislative means used to
achieve that objective'. 3 ' Among the factors to be considered were, the
extent of harm that the denial of right might cause, whether there are
alternative and less restrictive measures that could have been pursued, public
participation, and compensation paid. The Commission considered the effect
so Endorois n 5 above at par 334.
1 Id at par 15.
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of the acquisition and displacement on the community and found that the
'upheaval and displacement' was disproportionate to 'any public need
1 2served by the game reserve'.
As for alternative measures, the Commission found that even if the
restriction on the right was in the public interest, there were less restrictive
alternatives that the government could have pursued. One way in which such
alternatives could be found is through the government's positive and
meaningful engagement with the community towards finding a better and
less restrictive way of establishing the game reserve. Since such alternative
was not sought, the right was rendered illusory. The Commission observed
that the respondent state has not only denied the Endorois community all
legal rights in their ancestral land, rendering their property rights essentially
illusory, but in the name of creating a game reserve and subsequent eviction
of the Endorois community from their own land, the Respondent state has
violated the very essence of the right itself, and cannot justify such
interference with reference to 'the general interest of the community' or
'public need'.33
The Commission considered other factors, such as the inescapable
connection between deprivation caused by displacement and the violations
of the right to life, and the idea that forced eviction of the community from
the land amounted to a gross violation of human rights, to fortify its findings.
In both situations the Commission found that the public interest test had not
been met because the government's action was hardly in accordance with
international law.
Public participation
African governments are under immense pressure to grow their economies,
create jobs, and eliminate poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, and all other
ills associated with underdevelopment. In their pursuit of these objectives,
they rely almost exclusively on imported ideologies of development which
expand the role of international bureaucracy while minimising the relevance
of local communities. After all, most projects come with the blessing of the
self-appointed priests of development sitting in Europe or North America and
2 Id at par 214.
" Id at par 215.
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most recently, China.34 This speaks to the dismal influence that local
communities have on the implementation of development projects, a factor
that adversely affects their long term sustainability. Often, local communities
are presumed to lack the power or skills to improve their economic situation
and their collective worth is seen as significant only as a symbol of
underdevelopment and its malaise, and a mere justification for seeking
external support. So from the onset, there is an ideological disconnect
between the developmental agenda propagated by government, and the need
to protect those adversely affected by the implementation of the agenda.
Attendant upon this reality, has been the assumption that for every
development project, the benefit which accrues to the local community,
outweighs any undesirable consequences that the community might suffer as
a result. This is the logic upon which the government of Kenya sought to
defeat the claim by the Endorois community that they had not been consulted
and had also not participated in the decision regarding their displacement.
Elsewhere, I have argued that public interest cannot be met if there is no
participation by the community in the decision regarding their displacement
or resettlement. The idea of participation has become the sine quo non for
implementing development goals that have repercussions on community life.
It follows, therefore, that if the project sought to be implemented is in the
public interest, there is an immediate expectation that the public will be
consulted and their input in the design and implementation taken into
account. In this case, the Commission found that the Endorois community
had not been allowed to participate effectively in the decision to convert their
traditional land into a game reserve.3 Moreover, given the significance ofthe
land to the community, the absence of a guarantee of any tangible benefit
from the project, could hardly be in the public interest. 36
Compensation
A corollary to the issue of participation is the question of compensation. The
emergent norms on displacement appear to place a greater emphasis on
restitution rather than on compensation. For example, the Pinheiro Principles
explicitly enjoin states to accord priority to restitution as a preferred means
3I borrow this characterisation from William Easterly 'Ideologies of development'
Foreign Policy Washington DC July/August 2007 at 31 available at:
http://1araloewenstein.typepad.com/files/kuehne-03-easterly.pdf (last accessed 15 January
2013).
5 Endorois n 5 above at par 228.
36 Ibid.
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of safeguarding the IDPs rights to property. 3 The Principles further decree
that compensation should be available in circumstances where restitution is
not possible. Apart from IDP law, the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples provides that 'indigenous peoples have the right to
restitution of the lands, territories, and resources which they have
traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used and which have been
confiscated, occupied, used or damaged without free and informed
consent'.38 When such restitution is not possible, 'they have a right to just
and fair compensation'.3 9 If the obligations of the state are stated in these
terms, the obvious inference is that forced displacement is a heavy price that
states might well be advised to avoid. Secondly, a scheme of compensation
that would completely remedy the loss of the property in question is not easy
to attain.40 This may be so in cases where the property has value that is
incapable of being quantified in monetary terms. This was indeed the
dilemma in the Endorois case.
The documents before the Commission showed that about 170 members of
the Endorois community had been paid Kshs3 150 (approximately £30), and
the majority had received nothing.4 1 The amount, which was paid thirteen
years after their forceful removal, was allegedly intended to facilitate their
relocation. It did not compensate them for loss of property, including land.
The Commission found this to be woefully inadequate as it flew 'in the face
of common sense and fairness'. 42 Its view was that as the state did not pay
prompt and full compensation, it had failed to comply with domestic law in
this regard. The Commission also considered the question of restitution,
which in international law could be achieved by returning the land
compulsory acquired to the indigenous community. However, since such
measures were not employed by the state, it had a duty to allocate to the
community alternative lands of 'equal extension and quality', the
determination of which should be done in consultation with the community.4 3
7 Pinheiro Principles n 18 above at principle 2.2.
8 See UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples E/CN 4/Sub 2/1994/2/Addl
(1994) preambular par 5.
9 Id.
40 Note that the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples demands that the
compensation should take the form of 'lands, territories and resources equal in quality,
size and legal status' (see par 5).
4' Endorois n 5 above at par 230.
42 Id at par 236.
Id at par 234.
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Because this had not been done, the government of Kenya was in violation
of the right to property under article 14 of the Charter.
Some analysts have expressed reservations to the way in which the
Commission dealt with the question of restitution and compensation
generally.44 They allege that the Commission failed to recommend that the
Kenyan government should identify and demarcate the land belonging to the
community.45 They also argue that that there should have been a temporal
limit to the restoration of the rights found to have been violated by the
government.46 While these criticisms are valid, they reflect the complexity
of finding a suitable judicial remedy for violations in circumstances of
displacement. Perhaps, the durable solutions approach, which integrates
various schemes - including the participation of groups affected by
displacement - that is now ingrained in IDP law, could be worth considering
when courts are faced with such claims.
DEVELOPMENT AND DURABLE SOLUTIONS
The community's claim was that the displacement had separated them from
vital natural resources in their land, and denied them the rights freely to
dispose of their wealth and natural resources, contrary to article 21 of the
Charter. In addition, they claimed that the creation of the game reserve and
the refusal of the state to involve them in the development process, violated
their rights to development as guaranteed in article 21. Both claims have
implications in the construction of a proper understanding of durable
solutions within the context of development-induced displacement. Durable
solutions have been defined as 'the achievement of a durable and sustainable
solution to the displacement of persons through a voluntary and informed
choice of sustainable reintegration at the place of origin, sustainable local
integration in areas of refuge, or sustainable integration ... '.47 From this
definition, the search for durable solutions seems predicated on maintaining
a workable balance between the development agenda and protection schemes
for communities already displaced or in danger of being displaced.
Undoubtedly, there is an emerging principle that natural resources occurring
on land occupied by indigenous communities belong to that community,
especially if those resources are 'traditionally used and are necessary for the
Singoe & Shepherd n 8 above at 69.
Ibid.
46 Ibid.
See Internal Displaced Persons Act (2012), s 2.
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very survival, development and continuation of such people's way of life'.48
This principle was upheld by the Commission in Social andEconomic Rights
Action Centre for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria,4 9 and by the Inter-
American Court on Human Rights in Saramaka People v Suriname. 5
Displacement will, therefore, abrogate the possibility of the community
enjoying this right, if the event causing displacement is not preceded by
consultation with the community and all the safeguards are fulfilled. Thus,
durable solutions are conceptualised as providing a link between a
community's entitlement to the natural resources in their land, and the
protection scheme established under existing legal frameworks. For example,
although the Kampala Convention makes no direct reference to natural
resources, the inference can be drawn from article 11(5) which enjoins states
to 'take all reasonable measures to restore the lands of communities with
special dependency and attachment to such lands upon their return,
reintegration and reinsertion'. The idea seems to be that law should recognise
that the community's livelihood depends on the land, and that its right of
ownership extends to the natural resources available on that land. Therefore,
for these communities to return to normal life, and for the effects of the
displacement event to be completely remedied, there must be some kind of
restitution that takes care ofthe lost wealth in natural resources, if restoration
of land is no longer possible. Therefore, the right guaranteed under article 20
of the Charter could be seen as part and parcel of the broader scheme to
attain durable solutions.
The claim under article 21 of the Charter related directly to the right to
development. Similarly, the manner in which the Commission interpreted the
right to development correlates with the principle of durable solutions as
contained in IDP protection and assistance instruments. According to the
Commission, the right to development was both 'constitutive and
instrumental'. Its view was that development required the fulfilment of five
criteria, namely, that it is equitable, non-discriminatory, participatory,
accountable, and transparent.52 Notably, the Commission observed that the
48 Endorois n 5 above at par 261.
4 The Social and Economic Rights Action Centre for Economic and Social Rights v
Nigeria, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights Comm No 155/96 (2001).
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), case ofSaramaka People vSuriname
(Judgment 28 November 2007) Series C No 172.
5 Singoe & Shephered n 8 above at 93.
5 Endorois n 5 above at par 277. The criteria set out above are also embodied in art 2(3)
of the UN Declaration on the Right to Development, UN GAOR, 41" Session Doc
A/RES/41/128 (1986), which states that right to development includes, 'active, free and
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right to development did not simply refer to the physical such as schools and
roads, 'the result of the development should be the empowerment of the
Endorois community. It is not sufficient for Kenyan authorities to merely
give food aid to the Endorois. The capabilities and choices of the Endorois
must improve in order for the right to development to be realised.'53 Given
the position adopted by the Commission, it becomes apparent why
participation is critical to the realisation of the right to development. This is
also the key to finding durable solutions in circumstances of internal
displacement. Even where there has been consultation, the Commission
observed that there must be free and informed consent before community
resources and traditional lands of indigenous communities can be exploited.
The idea of a free and informed consent is now built into IDP protection
frameworks, including Kenya's Internally Displaced Persons Act 2012.5
SPECIAL VULNERABILITIES
Although displacement events render all persons affected by them
vulnerable, IDP protection instruments recognise special vulnerabilities in
certain category of displaced persons. The Guiding Principles identify the
special vulnerability of indigenous peoples, minorities, peasants, pastoralists,
'and other groups with a special dependency on and attachment to their
lands', and enjoin states to protect against displacement." The Great Lakes
Protocol also imposes the duty on member states to 'provide special
protection for displaced populations and other groups, with a special
dependency on or attachment to their lands'." Such protection must also be
extended to 'women, children, vulnerable, and displaced persons with
disabilities'." This approach is not unique to international instruments or
IDP law. At the domestic level, for example, the Constitution of Kenya
imposes the duty on state organs to 'address the needs of vulnerable groups
within society, including women, older members of society, persons with
disabilities, children, the youth, members of minority or marginalised
communities, and members of particular ethnic, religious or cultural
communities'. " These special vulnerabilities impose higher standards for
protection of rights and hence greater responsibility on states. As already
meaningful participation in development'.
5 Singoe & Shephered n 8 above at 75.
5 See s 22(1).
5 Guiding Principles n 4 above at principle 9.
6 Great Lakes Protocol n 4 above at art 4(l)(c).
5 Id art 4(l)(d).
8 Constitution of Kenya (2010) art 21(3).
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mentioned, most displacement arising from development projects in Kenya
have affected mainly communities that fall into the category of the specially
vulnerable groups and, therefore, they can claim protection through means
other than IDP law. However, I do believe that the rights that these groups
are entitled to and the methods of their enforcement, create opportunities for
expanding the protection regime in all circumstances where displacement is
caused by development projects, irrespective of the category of persons
involved. It may, therefore, be useful to examine how some of these
vulnerabilities were dealt with in the Endorois case.
Indigenous peoples
There are special vulnerabilities that are recognised by international treaties.
One such vulnerability is 'indigeneity', recognised and affirmed by the UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The Declaration gives no
definition of who an indigenous person is.5 However, its regime indicates a
bias towards recognition of the special vulnerability of beneficiaries of the
rights protection framework it establishes. In Africa, the recognition of
indigenous people has been controversial. The term does not even appear in
the Charter.o However, since 2005 when the Working Group of Experts on
the Rights of Indigenous Populations/Communities affirmed the existence of
marginalised groups 'who are discriminated in particular ways because of
their culture, modes of production and marginalised position within the
state', the special vulnerability of these groups has been generally accepted.'
In the Endorois case, the Commission acknowledged that although the
criteria for identifying an indigenous person is not all clear, considerable
emphasis has been placed on 'occupation of special territory, voluntary
perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness, self-identification as a distinct group,
an experience of subjugation, marginalisation, dispossession, exclusion or
discrimination'.62 According to the Commission, recognition of the
vulnerability of indigenous people arises from the need to address 'historical
and present day injustices and inequalities'.63 Having found that the Endorois
were a 'people' and therefore entitled to collective rights, the Commission
5 Cook & Sarkin 'Who is indigenous? Indigenous rights globally, in Africa, and among the
San in Botswana' (2004) 18 Tulane Joflnt'l & Comp L 93 98-100.
60 Bojosi & Wachira 'Protecting indigenous peoples in Africa: an analysis of the approach
of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights' (2006) 6 Afr Hum Rts J382,
390.
61 Lynch n 9 above at 37-38.
62 Endorois n 5 above at par 150.
63 Id at par 149.
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acknowledged their special vulnerability for which any protection measure
must, as a prerequisite, begin by acknowledging that their rights, interests,
and benefits in their traditional land, constituted 'property' under the
Charter.64 Therefore, the state had a duty to 'recognise the right to property
ofmembers ofthe Endorois community within the framework ofa communal
property system, and establish the mechanism necessary to give domestic
legal effect to such right recognised by the Charter and international law'.6"
The Commission was particularly critical of the lack of a proper legislative
framework for the protection of land rights of indigenous communities in
Kenya, since the trust land system was inadequate.
Secondly, the Commission was of the view that encroachments which result
in displacement of indigenous people must attract special consideration, and,
therefore, the general test of 'public interest' must be much more stringent
than in other cases:
The 'public interest' test is met with a much higher threshold in the case of
encroachment of indigenous land rather than individual private property. In
this sense, the test is much more stringent when applied to ancestral land
rights of the indigenous people.6 6
The Commission even suggested that the standards for determining such
interest, especially where there has been forceful removal, would be in
tandem with the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights
standards of 'exceptional circumstances and in accordance with the law',
stated in their General Comment No 4 on Evictions. In addition, the
Commission seemed to have subscribed to the view that when land rights of
indigenous communities are in issue, then the obligation to respect and
protect those rights must be articulated within the framework of duties
imposed on the state by international law. The most important duties in this
regard would be the obligation to issue titles and guarantee tenure; the duty
to establish a scheme for restitution or compensation in the event of violation
of such rights; and the general duty to consult and invite participation by
communities affected by any form of acquisition.
64 Ibid.
65 Id at par 196.
66 Id at par 212.
67 Id at par 211.
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The idea of culture
Displacements that affect groups with special vulnerabilities also interfere
with their culture. Reference to culture in this regard, draws on both the
ontological as well as the existential understanding of a community's distinct
status which is demanding of recognition in law. But as argued elsewhere,
culture as a normative concept faces considerable challenge in view of the
differing perceptions of what its normative value ought to be." The idea of
cultural rights can thus be as controversial as seeking an objective assessment
of the elements of a particular culture. This is perhaps the reason why the
varied definitions of culture appear fluid and rather bloated at times. The
safest approach for lawyers is often to lump even the most mystical and less
understood characteristics of a community's way of life together under the
rubric of culture, and then to seek protection of that community's way of life
under that rubric. In this way, cultural rights may acquire very wide, and
often contested, meanings, depending on the community and the values
sought to be propagated. In this case, for example, the Commission defined
culture as, that complex whole which includes a spiritual and physical
association with one's ancestral land, knowledge, belief, art, law morals,
customs and any other capabilities and habits acquired by humankind as a
member of society - the sum total of the material and spiritual activities and
products of a given social group that distinguish it from other similar
groups.6 9
The precise content in the elements mentioned in this definition is not unique
to the Endorois, and could very well be similar in a good number of the forty-
two Kenyan ethnic groups. Indeed, you may very well find that the beliefs,
art, language, and even the morals of the Endorois do not set them apart from
other Tugen groups of Northern Kenya. So the definition is not intended to
capture the uniqueness of a community's way of life, but to provide a legal
avenue for protecting that way of life.
As far as displacement is concerned, the aspect of physical separation from
one's habitual residence, and the disruptions to the rhythm of life necessarily
implicate their culture. However, for the indigenous and minority
communities, the forceful separation may have more serious implications on
their way of life than in other communities. The claims made by the
68 See Juma 'Dignified existence: reflections on aspects of culture and cultural rights debate
in Africa' (2008) 22(2) Speculum Juris 1-22.
69 Endorois n 5 at par 241.
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community based on the alleged violations of their rights to culture,
therefore, reflect the nature of their special vulnerability. Further, they
generally depict the patterns of cultural suffocation that indigenous people
or minority groups often suffer in situations where they are pushed out of
their land to make room for large-scale development projects."
In this case, therefore, the community claimed that the forceful displacement
had curtailed their access to cultural sites and damaged their pastoral way of
life. This, they claimed, amounted to the violation of their right to freely take
part in the cultural life of the community guaranteed under article 17 of the
Charter. According to the Commission, the rights embodied in article 17 go
'beyond the duty not to destroy or deliberately weaken minority groups but
requires respect for, and protection of, their cultural heritage essential to their
group identity'. ' Therefore, culture provided the connection between the
community and their land. The Commission found that having been removed
from the land, the community lost access to 'traditional medicines made form
herbs found around the lake and resources such as salt licks and fertile soil,
which provided support for their cattle and therefore their pastoralists way
of life'.72 By restricting access to Lake Bogoria, the community were denied
access to an 'integrated system of beliefs, values, norms, mores, traditions
and artefacts closely linked to access to the Lake'.
The decision in this matter provides an interesting perspective on protection
that is only marginally recognised in IDP law. For example, the Guiding
Principles protect the right of IDPs to communicate 'in a language that they
understand'. It also provides that all forms of education must respect the
'cultural identity, language and religion' of IDPs.7 The decision has now
reaffirmed the importance of culture in making development decisions.
Although it may be debatable whether cultural practices alone may defeat
development goals, in circumstances where displacements arise, it may very
well be a factor in determining rights' violations. In sum, the decision on this
issue serves to illustrate that displacement is a mammoth event that affects
the totality of people's lives.
7 Report of the African Commissions Working Group on Indigenous
Populations/Communites (2005) at 20.
7 Endorois n 5 above at par 241.
7 Id at par 131.
7 Id at par 250.
7 Guiding Principles n 4 above, art 22(e).
7 Id art 23(2).
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WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS
Having found that Kenya had violated the rights as briefly discussed in the
preceding paragraphs, the Commission recommended that Kenya recognise
the rights of the Endorois, and ensure restitution of their ancestral land,
remove all restriction of access to Lake Bogoria and surrounding sites for
religious and cultural purposes, pay adequate compensation, and provide
royalties for existing economic activities on their land."6 The commission
also recommended that the Kenyan government report on the implementation
of these recommendations within three months." The composite of remedies
recommended by the Commission fit readily into a scheme of protection for
persons displaced in such circumstances: they recognise the need for the
legitimacy (or maybe legality) of the decision to implement the project with
the potential of causing displacement; outline the possibility of full
restitution; impose the duty to pay adequate compensation; and, most
importantly, create a framework for ensuring that the community's wealth,
arising from the exploitation of their natural resources, are restored for their
development. Consequently, in addition to addressing the particular
circumstances of the Endorois community, the decision provides a template
for responding to development-induced displacement through the
instrumentality of a human rights mechanism." And, indeed, a protection
framework for displaced persons could very well be modelled on its terms.
What is perhaps disheartening, is the fact that implementation of the
recommendations has not been possible to any degree that might vindicate
our faith in a rights regime. Although the government's response to the
decision has not been entirely belligerent - at least on the face of it or in the
rhetoric of its leading politicians - from the point of view of repairing the
wrongs committed and assisting the community to thread its fractured
heritage into normalcy, little, if nothing, has been achieved. Immediately
after the decision was delivered, there was great optimism, perhaps fuelled
76 See Ashamu 'Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights
Group International on Behalf of the Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya: a landmark
decision from the African Commission' (2011) 55/2 JofAfr L 300, 311.
Endorois n 5 at par 298 (1)(g).
8 See Ashamu n 76 above at 312 (suggesting that the ruling will impact on other
indigenous groups, such as the San of Southern Africa, Pygmies of central Africa and
Maasai of Kenya, by providing a 'platform from which to voice their concerns and the
opportunity to seek protection from dispossession of land and natural resources within
the African human rights system').
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by promises by high level government officials.7 For example, the Minister
for Lands, when attending the community's celebration of their victory at the
Commission, pledged the government's commitment to ensuring that the
recommendations made by the Commission were implemented." However,
three years down the line, nothing much has happened. Although the
community has been allowed to graze their animals freely within the park and
to access the spiritual and religious sites, this remains at the discretion of
park authorities." Moreover, there has been no effort to formalise their
ownership rights. Frustrated by the inertia, suggestions have been made that
the community should approach local courts to enforce these
recommendations.8 2 But such a move will necessarily implicate the newly
passed Internal Displacement Act (2012), whose provisions enjoin the state
to respect and protect rights in circumstances such as those of the Endorois
community, and provide remedies similar to those recommended by the
Commission (except restitution). The availability of domestic legislation is
likely to embolden the move to seek recourse in local courts, a fact which
may provide the opportunity for entrenching international standards of
protection in Kenya's domestic law.
CONCLUSION
This article is a modest attempt to show how the link between displacement
and human rights can work to the advantage of displaced person or
communities. By focusing on the Endorois case, the article has shown that
the vision embodied in IDP laws, which encourage the use of existing
regional and continental mechanisms to effectuate rights, can indeed be
realised. It also demonstrates that the mix of international, human rights, and
humanitarian norms that informs the range of regimes that protect IDPs,
7 Kiprotich 'Will the state respect community's land rights' The Standard 22 March 2010
available at:
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?id=2000006073&catid=259&articlelD=2000006073
(last accessed 9 February 2013).
8 See Wanyeki 'Endorois get their land back ... what about you' East African available at:
http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/OpEd/comment/Endorois-get-their-land-back-what-
about-you/-/434750/887972/-/view/printVersion/-/gxkln5z/-/index.html (last accessed
8 February 2013).
8 Singoe 'The Endorois legal case and its impact on state and corporate conduct in Africa'
27 (2011), available at: http://www.natureandpoverty.net (last accessed 8 February
2013).
8 Okoth 'Cheers turn onto tears in the Endorois waiting for land' East African Standard,
8 June 2011 available at:
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articlelD=2000037356&pageNo=2&story title (last
accessed 8 February 2013).
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could be interpreted in way that empowers citizens to demand greater
accountability from government when its development agenda result in
adverse displacement (causes), and at the same time, articulate a range of
responsibilities as regards the rights and physical needs of victims
(consequences) that the government should bear. The Endorois case is in
many ways a victory for human rights, but also gives an added boost to the
protection framework of the development-induced IDPs.
